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Abstract 
 
We tested the impact of foreign direct investment on inequality in Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines- significant FDI recipients amongst 
developing nations from 1970-2001. Our time-series analyses of the estimated 
gini coefficients, employing the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) 
technique suggest that FDI improves income inequality in Malaysia and 
Indonesia but worsens inequality in Thailand while it proved insignificant for 
the Philippines.  
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Amongst developing nations, four Association of Southeast Asian nations’ 
(ASEAN) members-Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines-
received large portions of Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows via 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), entities of neoliberalism, from 1970-
2001.  For the same period of observation, inequality as measured by 
estimated gini coefficients seems to be improving in all but for the Philippines 
where it appears worsening. The ASEAN-4 nations’ inequality and FDI trends 
are shown in Table 1 and Figures 1a through 1d. Given the mixed trend of the 
ASEAN-4 nations, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship inequality and all FDI inflows in all four nations. 
 
The observations in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia tend to merit neo-
liberalism which postulates that markets are inherently efficient and that the 
STATE and public sector have no essential role in economic development 
either than facilitating the expansion, intensification, and primacy of market 
relations (Lowes, 2006).  As such, the neo-liberal FDI is hypothesized to 
improve inequality in the recipient nations. However, Philippines’ reverse 
trend lends some credence to the dependency position that associates FDI with 
increasing income inequality. Dependency theory which approaches the 
inequality problem from a world-economy and historical perspective 
maintains that it is the social control and organization of production as 
opposed to economic output and wealth that impact income inequality (Chase-
Dunn, 1975, Tsai, 1995) and this postulation is more than often 
operationalised as FDI stocks as opposed to FDI inflows. However, theorists 
and researchers working in the framework of neoclassical economics view 
investment dependence as a flow of resources into a country (Chase-Dunn, 
1975). However, to the best of knowledge and save for Kaufman (1975) and 
Mah (2003) who examined the impact of FDI flows on inequality to test the 
dependency hypothesis, the later dependency literature is somewhat 
ambiguous on the dependency position of FDI inflows per se and its 
association with inequality [Firebaugh, (1992) and Dixon and Boswell, 

















Table 1: Estimated Household Income Distribution (Gini Coefficients) 
and FDI(Current)(00 000 000)Dollars in ASEAN-4 Nations 
 
 Nation/Year 70 75 80 85 90 95 97 98 99 
Malaysia 
Gini 44.97 42 39.08 42.67 40.62 37.9 38.34 38.28 38.1 
Malaysia  
FDI  Flows 0.94 0.35 9.33 6.94 26.11 58.15 63.23 27.13 38.95
Thailand  
Gini 48.49 49.53 49.42 42.45 48.2 41.93 41.93 42.1 44.4 
Thailand  
FDI Flows 0.42 0.85 1.89 1.63 25.75 20.7 38.82 74.91 60.9 
Indonesia 
Gini 50.56 50.22 50.26 49.98 46.38 47.87 44.97 44.49  n/a  
Indonesia 
FDI Flows 0.83 4.76 1.8 3.1 10.92 43.46 46.78 -2.41 -18.7 
Philippines 
Gini 47.26 45.59 43.05 46.32 48.18 47.96 48.04 n/a n/a  
Philippines 




Figure 1a: Malaysia Estimated Income 
Distribution(Gini Coefficient)(%)



























Figure 1b: Thailand Estimated Income 
Distribution (Gini Coefficients) (%)

























Figure 1c: Indonesia Estimated Income Distribution 





























Figure 1d: Philipines Estimated Income 




























Reuveny and Li (2003) present several reasons on how FDI inflows might 
increase income inequality in a host nation.  First, MNCs can exert pressure on 
host governments to cut welfare expenditure and curb labor unions to reduce 
wages, both of which will have an adverse effect on lower and middle classes. 
The apparent ease at which MNCs can “pack up and leave for another host 
nation” is also a factor that decreases the bargaining power of host nations 
[Nafziger (1997), Salvatore (1998) in Reuveny and Li (2003)].  Second, MNCs’ 
repatriation of profits from less-developed countries (LDCs) causes 
underdevelopment and hurt the poor. Third, the capital-intensive techniques 
utilized by MNCs is thought to promote unemployment among unskilled laborers, 
and to distort income distribution by creating an economy with a small advanced 
sector and a large backward sector [Muller, (1979), Lall (1985), Jenkins (1996), 
Robbins (1996), Nafziger (1997) in Reuveny and Li (2003), (Sylwester, 2005).] 
This is akin to Feenstra and Hanson (1997)’s argument that FDI inflows into 
developing nations cause a higher wage for skilled workers than unskilled 
workers, resulting in widening income inequalities. Fourth, MNCs are alleged to 
have low remuneration in labor intensive industries such as footwear and clothing, 
and to push domestic suppliers to follow suit in order to reduce the MNCs 
purchasing cost [Barnet and Cavangh (1994), Held et al. (1999) in Reuveny and 
Li (2003)]. Fifth, domestic tax systems are not well suited to tax MNCs. The 
smaller tax base reduces government revenue-and therefore, welfare 
expenditures-, which places the poor at a disadvantaged position than it does the 
wealthy [Haitzius (1997) and Human Development Report (1999) in Reuveny and 
Li (2003)]. 
 
On the other hand, there are also several reasons on why FDI inflows might 
improve income inequality. First, MNCs provide developing nations with capital 
and technology, improve their corporate governance, and propagate better 
management practices. These forces, in turn, raise productivity and promote 
economic growth [Hanad and Harrison (1993), OECD, (1994), Coe et. al. (1994), 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1996), Marjusen and Venables (1999), Batra and Tan 
(1997) in Reuveny and Li (2003)]. 
 
Dollar and Kraay (2000) also support this view in which economic growth is 
thought to raise the income of the poor proportionally more than that of the rich, 
making FDI a useful for reducing poverty (Stiglitz, 1998). If FDI increases the 
demand for unskilled workers or provides economic opportunities for those who 
would not otherwise be employed, then host FDI nations would experience an 
improvement in income inequality (Sylwester, 2005, Mundell, 1957 in Mah 
2003).  
 
Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, some scholars argue that MNCs cannot 
easily relocate from one country to another in order to reduce their labor costs 
because lower wages are often associated with lower labor productivity. In this 
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manner, labor’s bargaining power is not necessarily diminished by FDI 
(Lawrence, 1994 in Reuveny and Li (2003)].  If FDI increases the demand for 
unskilled workers or provides economic opportunities for those who would not 
otherwise be employed, then host FDI nations would experience an improvement 
in income inequality (Sylwester, 2005). This view is also espoused by Mundell 
(1957) who suggested that FDI inflows contribute to a reduction of income 
distribution in developing countries as is known as Mundell’s hypothesis.  
Furthermore, it is argued that host governments can regulate the operation of 
MNCs, thus controlling their effects on host economies [Vernon, (1971), and 
Kurzer (1993) in Reuveny and Li (2003)]. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The first literature reviewed is a cross-national study on the effects of 
international economic dependence on development and inequality by Christopher 
Chase Dunn (1975).  This  simple study tests the effects of investment 
dependence as in FDI stocks on income inequality with gini coefficients as proxy 
at two points in time, 1950, and 1970.  Dunn reported that the two variables, 
foreign investment and debt, are positively correlated and may have similar 
effects on economic development and income inequality. The hypothesis that 
dependence maintains income inequality in peripheral countries is weakly 
supported as the dependence effects are positive but not statistically significant. 
 
Saltz (1992) presents empirical evidence that FDI stock skews the income 
distribution of the Third World. Saltz’s results show that a larger presence of FDI 
stocks significantly increases the share of income of the wealthiest households 
and decreases the share of income of the poorest households. The rationale is that 
the degree of monopolization by multinationals increases the return to capital and 
that MNCs use more capital-intensive technologies or produce mostly in more 
capital-intensive sectors. Thus, it is likely that a larger presence of FDI causes a 
higher share of income to accrue to wealthier households.  
 
Tsai (1995) tests the relationship between FDI stocks and income inequality as 
measured by gini coefficients by comparing models with and without 
geographical dummies using OLS. The results show that only East and Southeast 
Asia’s less developing nations appear to be harmed by FDI during 1970s. In other 
words, to the extent that FDI does have a negative impact on host countries’ 
income distribution, it is truer for Asia in the 1970’s than in any other 
geographical area. The results refer to marginal impacts only since there is no 
definite way to tell from a regression coefficient the total impact of any 
explanatory variable on dependent variables. Hence, even in the marginal sense, 
Tsai’s results tend to be supportive of the arguments of dependency theorists as 
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far as Asia is concerned for a given time period but not for Latin America and 
Africa. 
 
Mah's (2003) empirical model examines the impact of globalization on income 
distribution in Korea from 1975 through 1995. Trade expansion (openness ratio) 
and FDI inflows are the two proxies for globalization and proved insignificant in 
influencing the gini coefficients. The empirical evidence shows that neither the 
openness ratio nor FDI inflows significantly influence Gini coefficients contrary 
to the widely held notion that globalization worsens income distribution. Hence, 
neither Mundell’s (1957) hypothesis which predicts that larger FDI inflows 
improve income distribution in developing countries  nor the arguments of  
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) as well as that of dependency theory which both 
postulate that larger FDI inflows worsens income distribution are supported by 
Mah’s empirical findings.  Even Figini-Gorg’s two-stage hypothesis that gini 
coefficients rise and then fall with increase in FDI inflows is also not supported in 
the study. However, caution is required in interpreting Mah’s results as several 
explanatory variables such as gross national product and its squared value as well 
as those of FDI inflows were not stationary at any reasonable level of significance 
and hence cointegration tests were not pursued in the study rendering the results 
spurious. Hence, the results are at best suggestive and not definitive. 
 
3. Empirical Model 
 
Hence, we propose the following model to test Neoliberal theory in tandem with 
Mundell (1957)’s hypothesis as well as that of dependency theory Mah (2003) 
and the corroborating postulation of Feenstra and Hanson (1997) on income 
distribution in the ASEAN-4 nations: 
tttttt TRADEDOMFDIGDPGini εβββββ +++++= 43210   (1) 
where 
tGini       = Estimated Gini index X 100 
tGDP      = real per capita GDP  
tFDI       = nominal gross FDI inflow as % nominal GDP 
tDOM    = nominal gross Domestic Investment as % nominal GDP 
tTRADE  = Import +Export/ GDP X 100  
 
Based on Kuznet’s hypothesis, it is expected 
1β >0     
 
Based on Neo-liberal theories, it is expected: 
0,, 432 <βββ  
 
Based on Mundell hypothesis, it is expected: 
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2β < 0 
 
Based on dependency theory Mah (2003) it is expected: 
23 ββ <   04,2 >ββ  
 
Based on Feenstra and Hanson (1997), it is expected: 
2β  >0 
 
4. Variables and Data 
 
The gini coefficients used in this study are based on the University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) headed by Professor Kenneth Galbraith.  Although pay 
inequality and income inequality are different economic concepts, they are related 
argue Galbraith and Kum (2004).  Galbraith and Kum consider manufacturing pay 
as a significant component of all pay in most countries because pay makes up the 
largest single element in income for the majority of countries.  Moreover, the 
manufacturing sector is very important to the economy justify Galbraith and Kum.  
“Largely unskilled (and low-wage) workers in manufacturing are substitutes for 
unskilled (and similarly low-wage) workers in services and agriculture, and vice 
versa further justify the researchers” (Galbraith and Kum, 2004, p.8). Galbraith 
and Kum postulate that it is probable (though not certain) that changes in 
inequality inside manufacturing will tend to reflect changes in inequality in the 
structure of overall pay.  These set of Ginis are the most comprehensive data set 
surveyed.  Furthermore, they represent an exciting alternative in estimating 
income inequality throughout the world as opposed to using the Deninger and 
Squire Ginis data set that are computed from a mixed bag of household income 
and expenditure surveys, a mixed of different measures of inequality, gross and of 
net income, and a mixed of measures that are both personal and household income 
inequality.  Moreover, UTIP ginis are standardized and can compare between vast 
numbers of nations possible, as well as easily downloaded from the UTIP website 
without any restrictions on their publication.   
 
Barro (2000) in Mah (2003) shows that Gini value rises with GDP per capita for 
its value less than US 1,600 and declines hereafter.  Hence, modernization or 
neoclassical theory postulates that at the initial stage of development, GDP 
worsens income distribution.  GDP per capita (Tsai, 1995) as opposed to GNI per 
capita (Mah, 2003) was chosen because FDI in the ASEAN-4 nations is thought 
to contribute more to GDP as opposed to GNI.  The real GDP per capita income is 
based on 1995 prices and sourced from the World Development Indicators 2003.  
From 1970 to 2001, none of the ASEAN-4 nations had increased its GDP per 
capita to its squared value and thus, we have chosen the linear versions of the 
income inequality model by omitting the squared term of GDP per capita.  
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In the developing labor abundant countries, the returns to laborers have been 
manifested both in lower income inequality within the workforce and in lower 
levels of unemployment among prospective workers (Mah, 2003).  Trade theory 
based on the Hercksher-Ohlin (HO) theorem predicts that trade liberalization 
leads to greater specialization and a rise in national income in participating 
countries, following a more rational global allocation of production inspired by 
the principle of comparative advantage.  In labor-abundant countries, trade 
liberalization is expected to switch production from capital-intensive and 
inefficient import-substitutes towards efficient labor-intensive exportables.  The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem posits that such shifts lead to the convergence in the 
prices of goods and factor remunerations.  As a result, domestic inequality is 
expected to decline in countries endowed with an abundant labor supply and to 
rise in those with an abundant endowment of capital, as the demand for and 
remuneration of the latter (that exhibits an unequal income distribution) will 
increase, while the demand and remuneration of labor (that is distributed more 
equitably) will fall [Kenen, (2000)].  TRADE, both a proxy of openness and trade 
dependence, will be measured in terms of Import + Export / GDP X 100 (Mah, 
2003).  This measurement eliminates the possible biases caused by the official 
exchange rate (Mah, 2003).  Essentially, TRADE openness captures the degree 
that each nation is integrated into the global economy. Neo-classical together with 
neo-liberal theory predicts that the integration into the global economy facilitates 
development, while dependency theory posits that this provides through which 
any of the deletrious processes of foreign involvement in the local economy might 
operate, thus creating inequality.  
 
Besides TRADE, Mah (2003) contends that the impact of FDI inflows on income 
distribution in developing countries must be taken into consideration since it 
impacts income distribution in the ASEAN-4 in the same manner that TRADE 
does as described by the Stolpher-Samuelson theorem.  Maher, Jesuit, & Roscoe, 
(1999) in Mah (2003) assert that there is not much literature on the impact of FDI 
inflows on income distribution although the relationship between the two is prima 
facie.  Assuming international capital movement from a developed country to a 
developing one, more capital exists in the developing country than previously 
present.  Wage would rise in the developing country which has attracted FDI 
reflecting an increase in marginal product of labor   Thus, Mundell hypothesizes 
that the increase of FDI inflows reduces income inequalities in developing 
countries [Mundell (1957 in Mah (2003)].  While modernization theorists seldom 
address the distributional impact of FDI directly and explicitly, their position is 
clearly implied in their treating foreign and domestic capital as homogeneous 
goods.  Modernization theory postulates that regardless of origin, capital drives 
growth and its benefits eventually spread throughout the economy (Tsai, 1995).  
Thus, even if FDI initially stimulates growth only in some leading sector, 
develops allied local elites, or leads to economic dualism, the growth in the 
leading sectors could result in improved income distribution in the long run.  
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Asean nations have experienced increasing employment at low wages, which in 
turn raises the labor share, and improving the size of distribution of income 
supports the postulation of modernization theory (Tsai, 1995).  Chase-Dunn 
(1974) in Rubinson (1976) argues that foreign capital gravitates to those areas 
where domestic capital is low because profits would be higher there, and a low 
level of domestic capital increases income inequality.  Also Streeten (1973) in 
Firebaugh (1992) reasons that domestic investment is more likely than FDI to 
contribute to public revenue, as transnational corporations are likely to avoid 
taxes through mechanisms such as “transfer pricing”.  Jackman (1982) postulates 
that in view of the central role assigned to capital investment, it would be wise to 
add the level of Gross domestic investment to the inequality equation to test 
modernization theory’s postulation that the source of the capital is not critical.  
FDI inflows and Gross Domestic investment will be expressed in terms of 
percentage GDP.   
 
5. Model Estimation: Autoregressive Modeling Approach 
 
We chose the Autoregressive modeling approach by Pesaran et. al. 2001 over the 
conventional maximum likelihood based on Johansen 1991 and Johansen and 
Juselius 1990 approach, used for the multivariate case, for several reasons. First, 
the ARDL approach which requires the dependent variable or regressor to be 
I(1)is mainly advantageous because the explanatory variables or regressands can  
either be purely I(0) or I(1) or a mix of both. The Johansen (1991) and Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) approach requires that the variables in the system be of equal 
order of integration.  Second, ARDL takes sufficient numbers of lags to capture 
the data generating process in a general-to-specific modeling framework 
(Laurenceson and Chai 2003:28 in Shrestha, 2005).  Third, the ARDL Error 
Correction Model integrates the short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium 
without losing long-run information. Fourth, this approach can be applied to 
studies with a small sample size such as this study. It is widely understood that the 
Engle & Granger 1987, and Johansen 1988, 1995 methods of cointegration are not 
reliable for small sample sizes.  Pattchis 1999, Tang 2001, Tang 2002, and Tang 
and Nair 2002 in Narayan and Smyth, 2005 all used sample sizes smaller than 30 
observations in their respective studies. 
 
6. Bounds Test Results 
 
The Bounds Test was used on all models to investigate the presence of a long run 
relationship among the variables specified for each nation. In table 2, the results 
of Pesaran et. al (2001) bounds test demonstrate that the null hypothesis 
c(1)=c(2)=c(3)=c(4)=c(5)=0 against its alternative, 
c(1)≠ c(2) )3(c≠ )4(c≠ 0)5( ≠≠ c  is easily rejected at the 1 % confidence level 
for all ASEAN-4 nations. The computed F-statistics for Malaysia at 6.938993, 
Thailand at 10.04337, Indonesia at 9.939957, and the Philippines at 10.03422 are 
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all greater than the upper critical bound of 4.68 for the 1% significance level. 
Hence, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at that level.  
 
Based on the test results, it is concluded that there exists a steady-state long-run 
relationship amongst the Gini Coefficient, GDP Per Capita, Domestic Investment, 
FDI, and TRADE for all four nations. Simply, for the ASEAN-4 nations, all five 
variables do not move “too far away” from each other in the long-run. 
 
Table 2: Bounds Test for Cointegration Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: No Cointegration 
Computed F-statistic (Wald Test):  
__________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
Malaysia                   :     6.938993 
Thailand                    :   10.04337 
Indonesia                  :     9.939957 
Philippines                :   10.03422 
__________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
               Critical Value 
    Lower                       Upper 
__________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
      1%   significance level                           3.41                           4.68 
       5%   significance level            2.62                         3.79 
10%   significance level                              2.26                                        3.35 
Decision: Reject or Accept null hypothesis at 1 % significance level 
Note: The critical value is taken from Pesaran et. al. (2001). Table C (iii) Case III. 
Unrestricted intercept  and no trend. 
 
 
Table 3: Long-run Elasticities 
 
  Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines 
GDP Per Capita -1.08** -0.36** -0.03 -0.10*** 
FDI -1.10** 0.09*** -0.13** 0.01 
Domestic Investment 1.95** 0.002 -0.18** -0.13** 
TRADE 0.46 0.36** 0.04 0.12** 
 





The computed results of the long-run elasticities for the determinants of the Gini 
coefficient are shown in Table 3. 
 
The estimated results show that for Malaysia, GDP per capita, FDI, and Domestic 
Investment significantly influence the level of the gini coefficient. The estimated 
coefficients imply that a 1% increase in GDP per capita and FDI will lower the 
gini index by 1.108 % and 0.57% respectively.  The negative sign for 1β  does not 
support Kuznet’s hypothesis but it is supported by Bornschier (1983) linear 
model’s results. The significantly negative value for coefficient 2β   neither 
supports dependency theory as postulated by Mah 2003 nor Feenstra and 
Hanson’s hypothesis. Alternatively, it supports the neo-classical and neoliberal 
postulations as well as Mundell’s hypothesis.   A 1% increase in domestic 
investment will worsen the gini index by 1.95% and hence, coefficient 3β ’s 
positive value does not support the postulation of the neo-liberal position that 
capital is capital. The different signs for FDI and domestic investment appear to 
augur well with the postulation that the Malaysian policymakers were politically 
motivated in encouraging FDI to ‘balance’ investment in the local economy. This 
period also coincided with the government’s affirmative action for Malaysia’s 
Bumiputras or sons of the soils beginning 1970s (Jomo, 2000). As far as 
inequality is concerned, it appears that FDI did have a positive impact in 
improving Malaysian inequality especially when domestic capital is associated 
with worsening inequality trend. The insignificance of TRADE does not fall 
neatly in either the neo-liberal or the dependency school of thought and would 
corroborate the postulation that the East Asian economies do not demonstrate any 
clear relationship between export-oriented industrialization and better income 
distribution (Jomo 2000) given that Malaysia is a nation with both high export 
and import values that are positively related with each other.  
 
For Thailand, the estimated results show that only GDP Per Capita, FDI, and 
TRADE are significant determinants of inequality.   As such, a 1% increase in 
GDP Per Capita will decrease the gini coefficient by 0.36 %.  Again, 1β ’s negative 
sign is in line with Bornschier (1983) as well as Ikemoto and Uehara(2000) who 
postulated that the Kuznets’ turning point could have happened several times in 
the Thai economy as in each time a new high-productivity industry is introduced 
into a matured economy.   A 1 % increase in FDI will lead to a rise of 0.09 % in 
the gini coefficient which supports the dependency position as postulated by Mah 
2003.  Conversely, this finding supports neither the neo-liberal position nor 
Mundell’s hypothesis.  Hence, 2β ’s positive sign means that FDI worsens income 
inequality in Thailand and  is supported by Ikemoto and Uehara who postulated 
that the emergence of export-oriented manufacturing industries established by 
FDI increased income inequality in Thailand in the latter 1980s.  Velde and 
Morrisey (2002) contends that Thailand attracted a quarter of FDI inflows into 
capital-intensive and relatively skill-intensive chemical, machinery, and electrical 
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manufacturing sectors implying that FDI composition effect is unlikely to have 
reduced wage inequality which would have resulted in lower income inequality 
since wage is a large component of income. The crux of Ikemoto and Uehara’s 
thesis is that when an economic structure is rapidly changing, income inequality 
tends to be higher as in the case of Thailand.  Thus, it is no surprise then that 3β  
proved insignificant and rendering Thailand’s domestic investment insignificant 
in determining income inequality given that the Thai economy was changing to a 
domestic-oriented economy in the mid-1990s and the direction of income equality 
could not be established by Ikemoto and Uehara. Essentially the export-oriented 
economic growth could absorb the under-employed labor force in rural areas but 
it failed to decrease income inequality perhaps because the Thai economy was 
changing to a domestic-oriented economy that subsequently resulted in the bubble 
economy which burst in 1997 at the onset of the Asian financial crisis. In line 
with dependency theory as postulated by Mah (2003), 4β ’s negative sign renders 
TRADE to have worsened income inequality for Thailand. As such a 1% increase 
in TRADE will worsen income inequality by 0.36%. Dependency theory is 
supported here and neo-liberal theory refuted. 
  
Indonesia’s estimated results indicate that only FDI and domestic investment 
significantly influence the level of inequality. As such 1β  is insignificant. Perhaps 
the level of economic development is less important than the Indonesian 
government’s redistributive policies and their implementation in combating 
inequality given the vastness of the nation and the concentration of development 
in Java.(quote from growth paper). Given that both 2β  and 3β  have negative 
signs, a 1% increase in FDI and domestic investment will lead to a decrease in 
gini coefficient by 0.13% and 0.18% respectively.  2β ’s negative sign supports 
the neo-classical and neoliberal postulations as well as Mundell’s hypothesis and 
refutes dependency theory as postulated by Mah (2003) as well as Feenstra and 
Hanson’s hypothesis. 2β ’s positive sign is supported by Oshima (1998) who 
explained that import-substitution policies protecting capital-intensive industries 
began to be dismantled in the mid-1980s, and export promotion was initiated 
under deregulation, devaluation, liberalization, and other reforms. According to 
Oshima, labor-intensive industries and non-petroleum exports grew rapidly while 
severe underemployment, which included 45% of the labor force in 1975 and 
38% in 1980 fell dramatically to 13% in 1986. Consequently, this contributed to 
lowering of the rural Gini coefficient during the 1980s.  The UNDP-DITE (2006) 
sectoral FDI data corroborates Oshima’s analyses since approximately 60% of 
FDI flowed into manufacturing which is a generally labor-intensive industry from 
1989 through 2004. Again, the insignificance of TRADE is corroborated by Jomo 
(2000). 
 
 In Philippines’ case, only GDP Per Capita, Domestic Investment and TRADE are 
significant in determining the level of inequality. A 1% increase in GDP Per 
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Capita will decrease inequality by 0.10%. As in previous cases, 1β ’s negative sign 
is corroborated by Bornschier (1983).  However, unlike in the previous cases, 2β  
is insignificant and renders FDI insignificant in determining the dependent 
variable (Velde and Morrisey, 2002). Hence, all of the study’s postulations and 
hypotheses are not supported in this instance. 3β  has a negative sign which 
translates to a 1% increase in domestic investment to having decrease the gini 
coefficient by 0.18%. This finding is supported by Bello (2006) who advocates 
the necessity to accumulate the capital necessary for strategic investments such as 
reinvigorating local manufacturing and agricultural industries through flexible 
application of the principle of subsidiarity or whatever can be produced at the 
local level at the least cost should be undertaken at that level. 4β  is significant  
and a 1% increase in TRADE  will to a 0.12% increase in income inequality. 




This study examines the impact of FDI inflows on income distribution in 
individual ASEAN-4 nations from 1970 through 1999 using the ARDL approach.  
ARDL developed by Pesaran et.al (2001) is most suitable for small sample size 
studies such as this.  GDP Per Capita, Domestic Investment, and Trade were 
included in the study to help explain the level of income distribution inequality in 
each nation. Essentially, this study tests several postulations. First is the Kuznet’s 
hypothesis which falls under the umbrella of neo-liberalism that initial increases 
in GDP per capita would lead to increased inequality. Second is the dependency 
theory as postulated by Mah (2003) that FDI inflows worsen inequality. Third is 
the neoclassical and neo-liberal postulation that FDI inflows improve inequality. 
Fourth is Mundell’s hypothesis, also a child of neo-liberalism, that FDI inflows 
improve income inequality.   Fifth is that TRADE improves income distribution 
as postulated by the neo-classicals and neo-liberals and that it worsens inequality 
as postulated by dependency theorists.  Hence, this study is a dichotomy of neo-
liberal and dependency theory. 
Increases in GDP per capita and FDI inflows help improve inequality in Malaysia 
whereas increases in domestic investment appear to have a reverse impact. 
TRADE proved insignificant. The Malaysian case validates both neo-liberal 
claims. However, the insignificance of TRADE falls in neither school-of-thought.   
 
Higher GDP per capita improves inequality for Thailand but higher FDI and 
TRADE worsens it. Hence, as far as FDI and TRADE are concerned, the 
postulations of dependency theory are upheld and the insignificance of Domestic 
investment renders support to neither school of thought. 
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As for Indonesia, both FDI and Domestic Investment improve income inequality 
which validates the postulations of neo-liberalism but the insignificance of GDP 
per capita and TRADE does not support either school of thought.  
 
For the Philippines, increases in GDP per capita and Domestic Investment 
improve income inequality but increases in TRADE worsen inequality which 
supports dependency theory. The insignificant FDI cannot be supported by either 
school of thought.  
 
Neo-liberal thought is dominant in both Malaysia and Indonesia but Thailand’s 
findings give much merit to the arguments of dependency theory. If globalization 
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Table A: Results of the Augmented  Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
 
  Augmented Dickey Fuller                       Phillips-Perron Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron 
                         Test 
                   
Test                          Test 
                  
Test  
  Level, No Trend Level, Trend Level, No Trend Level, Trend Ist difference       
LMGDPPC -1.299400(0) 1.730586(0) -1.257404(1) -1.909299(1) -4.338705(0)* ** -4.445077(0)* ** -4.354665(1)* ** -4.460198(1)* ** 
LMDOM -2.577208(1) -2.906194(1) -2.126948(1) -2.188062(1) -4.142183(0)* ** -4.123558(0)** -4.164567(1)* ** -4.148395(1)** 
LMFDI -2.360528(0) -2.217908(0) -2.341061(1) -2.199225(1) -6.428858(0)* ** -6.424913(0)* ** -6.431289(1)* ** -6.431198(1)* ** 
LMEXP 0.125900(0) -3.355337(0) 0.145819(1) 3.441441(1) -6.089666(1)* ** -5.997186(1)*  ** -5.347183(1)* ** 5.319614(1)* ** 
LMHC 6.482882(0)* ** -1.348718(0) 6.427694(1)* ** -1.343963(1) -3.030320(0)** -5.473502(2)* ** -2.998993(1) -4.647588(1)* ** 
LTGDPPC -0.928173(1) 1.986170(1) -0.596621(1) -1.398454(1) -3.108496(0) ** -3.097241(0) -3.163426(1)** -3.143710(1) 
LTDOM -2.211653(1) -1.356665(0) -1.792365(1) -1.594135(1) -4.322448(0)* ** -4.369921(0)* ** -4.336675(1)* ** -4.376928(1)* ** 
LTFDI -2.163167(0) -2.625081(0) -2.242788(1) -2.803079(1) -5.468957(0)* ** -5.402358(0)* ** -5.469105(1)* ** -5.402606(1)* ** 
LTEXP -0.815406(0) -2.426663(0) -0.782132(1) -2.419561(1) -6.516736(0)* ** -6.404957(0)* ** 6.525751(1)* ** -6.412826(1)* ** 
LTHC 2.341432(0) -1.092512(0) 2.337776(1) -1.129283(1) -3.898050(0)* ** -4.263831(0)** -3.924638(1)* ** -4.269305(1)** 
LIGDPPC -1.828816(0) -0.588236(0) -1.710269(1) -0.903883(1) -3.969341(0)* ** -4.269396(0)** -3.983951(1)* ** -4.284313(1)** 
LIDOM -1.945298(0) -1.742957(0) -2.119759(1) -1.883977(1) -4.406805(0)* ** -5.273332(0)* ** -4.421170(1)* ** -4.516232(1)* ** 
LIFDI -2.334102(0) -3.331335(1) -2.568051(1) -2.723986(1) -4.847377(1)* ** -4.754558(1)* ** -4.697610(1)* ** -4.620578(1)* ** 
LIEXP -2.381232(0) -2.796891(0) -2.331230(1) -2.766453(1) -6.490995(0)* ** -6.390451(0)* ** -6.497581(1)* ** -6.395057(1) 
LIHC 9.439870(0)* ** -3.422209(0) 8.410887(1)* **  -3.364329(1) -2.278501(0) -3.453136(0) -2.250054(1) -3.453722(1) 
LPGDPPC -2.893563(1) -3.014309(1) -2.334287(1) -2.164366(1) -2.980242(0)** -2.959669(0) -3.107834(1)** -3.098559(1) 
LPDOM -2.316783(1) -2.975125(1) -1.743960(1) -2.211181(1) -4.425238(1)* ** -4.513966(1)* ** -3.983559(1)* ** -3.990438(1)** 
LPFDI -2.325775(0) -2.523062(0) -2.235070(1) -2.44227(1) -6.545316(0)* ** -6.490933(0)* ** -6.546237(1)* ** -6.492240(1)* ** 
LPEXP 0.034208(0) -1.554838(0) -0.040166(1) -1.623349(1) -5.055146(0)* ** -5.117741(0)* ** -5.055690(1)* ** -5.119255(1)* ** 
LPHC 5.879084(0)* ** -0.958393(1) 4.646257(1)* ** 0.857312(1) -1.900415(0) -2.550913(0) -1.901259(1) 2.589312(1) 
 
Note:*   and ** denote significant at the 1%, and 5% significance levels respectively. 
Table B: Malaysia: Unrestricted Error Correction Model Results 
  
Variable         Coefficient          Std. Error           Prob. 
LMGINI(-1) -0.2457 0.1178 0.0636 
LMGDPPC(-1) -0.2654 0.0843 0.0104 
LMFDI(-1) -0.2696 0.0617 0.0014 
LMDOM(-1) 0.4799 0.0935 0.0004 
LMTRD(-1) 0.1142 0.0785 0.1762 
DUM -0.0151 0.0062 0.0361 
D(LMGINI(-1)) -0.4035 0.2354 0.1173 
D(LMFDI(-1)) 0.2085 0.0447 0.0009 
D(LMFDI(-2)) 0.1395 0.0477 0.0152 
D(LMFDI(-3)) 0.1383 0.0387 0.0050 
D(LMDOM(-1)) -0.2912 0.0578 0.0005 
D(LMDOM(-2)) -0.3309 0.0787 0.0018 
D(LMDOM(-3)) -0.2413 0.0678 0.0052 
D(LMTRD(-1)) -0.1659 0.0883 0.0896 
C 0.6382 0.2217 0.0164 
 N=25      
 Adjusted R-squared 0.6622    
 S.E. of  regression 0.0050    
 F-statistic 4.3609    
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0122     
 Test-Statistics      P-value  
Jarque-Bera Normality Test 0.8914 0.6404  
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (Lag 1) 3.1441 0.1100  
ARCH Test    (Lag 1)  0.1306 0.7213  























Table C: Thailand: Unrestricted Error Correction Model Results 
 
Variable         Coefficient          Std. Error Prob. 
LTGINI(-1) -2.0074 0.3589 0.0002 
LTGDPPC(-1) -0.7164 0.1319 0.0003 
LTFDI(-1) 0.1870 0.0875 0.0583 
LTDOM(-1) 0.0034 0.1113 0.9765 
LTTRD(-1) 0.7267 0.1526 0.0008 
D(LTGINI(-1)) 2.0050 0.4021 0.0005 
D(LTGINI(-2)) 0.6380 0.2805 0.0462 
D(LTGINI(-3)) 0.9076 0.2703 0.0073 
D(LTGDPPC(-1)) -1.4174 0.6077 0.0419 
D(LTGDPPC(-2)) 0.4855 0.4034 0.2565 
D(LTGDPPC(-3)) 0.8960 0.4317 0.0647 
D(LTFDI(-1)) -0.4390 0.1687 0.0264 
D(LTFDI(-2)) -0.8926 0.1935 0.0010 
D(LTDOM(-1)) 0.3232 0.1332 0.0356 
D(LTDOM(-3)) -0.3939 0.1068 0.0042 
D(LTTRD(-1)) -0.7249 0.1497 0.0007 
C 4.2578 0.7117 0.0001 
N=25     
Adjusted R-squared 0.6622    
S.E. of regression 0.0050    
F-statistic 4.3609    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0122     
    Test-Statistics        P-value   
Jarque-Bera Normality Test 0.1739 0.9167   
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (Lag 4) 4.0330 0.0635   
ARCH Test    (Lag 1)  1.8496 0.1865   






















Table D: Indonesia: Unrestricted Error Correction Model Results 
 
Variable         Coefficient          Std. Error Prob. 
LIGINI(-1) -1.1249 0.1841 0.0000 
LIGDPPC(-1) -0.0290 0.0376 0.4543 
LIFDI(-1) -0.1498 0.0508 0.0113 
LIDOM(-1) -0.2066 0.0807 0.0238 
LITRD(-1) 0.0404 0.0413 0.3458 
D(LIGINI(-1)) 0.3813 0.1592 0.0324 
D(LIGDPPC(-3)) -0.5015 0.2154 0.0367 
D(LIFDI(-2)) 0.1053 0.0428 0.0287 
D(LIDOM(-1)) 0.2709 0.0796 0.0047 
D(LITRD(-1)) -0.1077 0.0340 0.0075 
D(LITRD(-3)) -0.1447 0.0373 0.0019 
C 2.3354 0.3644 0.0000 
N=25     
Adjusted R-squared 0.6377    
S.E. of regression 0.0057    
F-statistic 4.8409    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0045     
    Test-Statistics        P-value  
Jarque-Bera Normality Test 1.5093 0.4702  
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (Lag 1) 0.3774 0.5504  
ARCH Test    (Lag 1)  0.2259 0.6393  





















Table E: Philippines: Unrestricted Error Correction Model Results 
 
Variable         Coefficient          Std. Error Prob. 
LPGINI(-1) -0.8930 0.2187 0.0015 
LPGDPPC(-1) -0.0894 0.0485 0.0900 
LPFDI(-1) 0.0056 0.0626 0.9300 
LPDOM(-1) -0.1125 0.0198 0.0001 
LPTRD(-1) 0.1096 0.0347 0.0082 
D(LPGINI(-1)) 0.3959 0.1847 0.0533 
D(LPGINI(-2)) 0.1388 0.1401 0.3416 
D(LPFDI(-1)) -0.0470 0.0498 0.3635 
D(LPDOM(-1)) 0.0714 0.0269 0.0212 
D(LPDOM(-2)) 0.1050 0.0280 0.0028 
D(LPTRD(-1)) -0.1859 0.0416 0.0008 
D(LPTRD(-2)) -0.1456 0.0469 0.0091 
C 1.7382 0.3969 0.0001 
N=25     
Adjusted R-squared 0.7176    
S.E. of regression 0.0048    
F-statistic 4.3609    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0122     
         Test-Statistics        P-value  
Jarque-Bera Normality Test 0.0167 0.9917  
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (Lag 2) 3.4290 0.0734  
ARCH Test    (Lag 1)  3.7379 0.0662  
Ramsey Reset (Lag 1)                             2.2562 0.1612  
 
 
 
 
 
